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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs •
RICHARD W. JONES,

Case No. 900526-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant-Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

This Brief is in response to the Brief of Appellee submitted
to this Court on May 28, 1991.

In order to clarify the position of

the appellant the organization of the State will be retained within
this Brief.
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The State misconstrues the standard of review in this case.
The defendant is not seeking to "set aside a sentence imposed by
the trial court" as stated by the appellee.
1-2).

(Appellee's Brief, pp.

Rather, Defendant is seeking specific performance of the

plea agreement which was the ultimate result of the sentencing
proceeding.

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.

57 (1971); State v.

Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The State proclaims that "no constitutional provisions,
statutes or rules are directly applicable to the resolution of this
appeal."

(Appellee!s Brief, p. 2 ) . This statement simply is
-1-

incorrect.

There can be no question but that Rule 11 of the Utah

Rules of Criminal Procedure must be examined in depth before this
case can be decided.

In addition, the due process and double

jeopardy clauses of the United States Constitution and the Utah
Constitution also require that a court which has accepted a plea
agreement must in fact carry out that agreement except in the most
extraordinary cases.

The specific provisions of statutory and

constitutional law will be addressed infra in this Brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State has seriously omitted essential statement of facts
to a determination of this case.

The sequence of events which

occurred in this case are critical in understanding the argument
now advanced by the appellant.
As noted in Appellant's Opening Brief most of the negotiations
concerning this case had already occurred in the Circuit Court.

As

of April 20, 1990 Defendant and the State had reached a tentative
agreement that Defendant would plead to one count of the indictment
and that the remaining charges would be dismissed.

At that point

the prosecutor was requesting that Defendant plea guilty to a
second degree felony with the provision that the prosecutor would
recommend counseling in lieu of incarceration.

Defendant, on the

other hand, asserted that he would only plead guilty to a third
degree felony.

See Transcript of April 20, 1990 attached herein

as Addendum 1. In any event, however, by the time the case reached
the District Court the only matter left to be resolved between the
State and the defendant was the degree of the felony and not the
number of charges to be tried.
-2-

The uncontested affidavit of the defendant filed in the
District Court describes this early sequence of events.
50-53).

(R.

The defendant specifically wrote a letter on June 12, 1990

to his attorney Gilbert Athay formally demanding that Mr. Athay
file a "Motion for Acceptance of a Rule 11(8) (b) Plea."

(R. 56-57)

(A copy of this letter is contained herein as Addendum 2) .

In this

letter the defendant stated that he would not agree to pleading to
a second degree felony charge unless the court had under Rule
11(8) (b) formally approved the plea agreement thereby assuring the
defendant he would not be incarcerated.

He specifically told Mr.

Athay in the letter:
I once told you that if push came to shove, I would
eventually accept a second degree plea with the
prosecutorfs recommendation of no incarceration.
However, after reading of several cases where people
ended in prison for one to fifteen year terms after
making a plea bargain carrying such a prosecutor
recommendation, I will not accept such an arrangement
unless it be under Rule 11(8)(b) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. (R. at 56).
The next significant event which occurred but which the State
makes no mention of was the conversation Defendant had with the
prosecutor on the morning of July 30, 1990.

In the uncontradicted

affidavit of co-counsel Lorin Pace the following summary is made:
That on the morning of July 30, 1990, the date set
for entering a plea, Defendant personally spoke to Tom
Vuyk, the prosecutor in the subject case, who told
Defendant that he wanted Defendant to plead to a second
degree felony in order that the State have a larger
deterrent to assure that Defendant completed counseling
and did not violate probation. This conversation has
been confirmed to your affiant by the prosecutor.
That upon receiving this promise from the
prosecutor, Defendant agreed that he would enter into a
plea bargain involving his pleading guilty to one second
degree felony count, provided that the State make the
-3-

same promise of disposition for therapy and probation in
lieu of incarceration, as well as to dismiss all other
counts and cases and to file no further charges against
the defendant. (R. 106).
The defendant believed at this point in time that a bargain
had indeed been made.

Defendant agreed to allow the State to

obtain a second degree felony conviction in exchange for its
promise that Defendant would not be incarcerated but would receive
therapy at an appropriate facility.
The appellee has stated a portion of the July 30 transcript in
its Brief.

(Appellee's Brief, pp.

2-3). However, this quotation

is taken out of context and in its correct application actually
supports the argument now being made by the defendant.

Prior to

the July 30 hearing the defendant was asked to sign a document
entitled "Statement of Defendant, Certificate of Counsel and
Order." Defendant's attorney and the prosecutor had already signed
this document.

(R.

99-104) (contained in the Addendum to this

Brief as Addendum 3 ) . Paragraph 13 states the following:
My plea of guilty is the result of a plea bargain
between myself and the prosecuting attorney. The
promises, duties and provisions of this plea bargain, if
any, are fully contained in the Plea Agreement attached
to this Affidavit. See above also. (R. 102-103).
In fact, there was no "Plea Agreement" in existence at that time
and the "See above" were handwritten statements which essentially
was the plea bargain.

These statements said:

(1) State moves to dismiss all other counts and
charges.
(2) State will recomend [sic] treatment in a
residential treatment center in lieu of incarceration.
(3) No new charges will be filed by the State
regarding cases now known to it. (R. 103). (Emphasis
-4-

added).
As will be noted in paragraph 2 above the handwritten plea
agreement contains a word which is not part of the English language
namely "recomend".

The importance of this misspelling will be seen

as the scenario of events unfolds.
On July 30 the lower court asked the defendant if he
understood that the maximum fine and imprisonment for a second
degree felony was $10,000 and 15 years.
understood,

(Tr.

July 30, 1990, p.

He replied that he

6)- The court then stated,

"Anybody is entitled to make a recommendation, but I'm not bound to
follow it.

Do you understand that?" The defendant replied, "I do."

(Id. p. 7 ) . This quotation is what the state now relies upon.
(Appellee's Brief, p. 3 ) . The court then painstakingly went
through the various elements required in a Rule 11 guity plea and
the rights that he was giving up.

(Id. at 9-12).

The lower

court in sensing that the defendant had some doubts concerning the
language in the plea agreement then stated the following:
You may not like the plea you're entering, but
that's not the criteria. I am sure you would like to
enter no plea, and leave here today with no charges, but
that's not going to happen, because the State won't
agree to it. So you've got a couple of alternatives.
We can either pursue this plea bargain, and based on
what I've heard at this point in time, I'm willing to
approve it, or we can go to trial. And the decision
really is yours. I want to make sure you have had
enough time to think about this, because this is a
serious decision in your life. And if you plead guilty
here today, you will be a convicted felon, and you'll be
a conicted felon in a type of crime that is looked upon
in this, as most communities, as a crime, if we
categorize crime, as one of the more base ones. Id.
at 13. (Emphasis added).
The defendant then stated that he would like more time to go

-5-

over the paperwork and to make sure that nothing was missing.

(Id.

at 14), He emphasized, "It could be that I'm just paranoid, but,
Your Honor, I would feel better for some more time." (Id. at 15).
At the conclusion of the July 30 hearing the defendant had
declined to sign the "Statement of Defendant." That day he began to
prepare a supplement to that document.

As stated in his

uncontradicted affidavit:
7. I drafted a Plea Agreement which stated my
understanding and intent which was attached to the court
requested document. It was first presented to counsel
who modified the agreement, including the types of cases
which could not be filed against me. The completed
document reflected my intention and the Statefs promise
that I be commended for treatment in a residential
treatment center. The words and forms were accepted by
the State of Utah.
8. Said Plea Agreement is attached (a separate
document), paragraph 2 of which includes the language
"the State will re-commend Defendant to be treated in a
program of a residential treatment center in lieu of
incarceration.
9. Deponent took the agreement to be one in which
he would be commended to a probation program for
treatment in a residential community center. This is
not happening. (R. 52) .
The uncontradicted affidavit of Lorin Pace also supports this
version of events by the defendant.

Mr. Pace stated:

6. That upon further review of the documents,
Defendant felt strongly that a separate instrument
entitled "Plea Agreement" be prepared and attached to
the Defendant's Statement, in order to make clear that
the State promised that the disposition of the case
would include probation and therapy in lieu of
incarceration, as well as the other points mentioned.
While doing this, Defendant noted that counsel had
misspelled the word commend by using the form "comend"
in making brief written notes on the defendant's
statement. Counsel had spelled the word "recomend"
which was understood by Defendant to "again commend"
Defendant to probation as he had been entrusted to
probation in an expunged 1976 case. To be consistent
-6-

with this meaning, Defendant properly spelled the word
"re-commend" which means to "again entrust" and has no
other connotation to Defendant. (R. 96).
The "Plea Agreement" referred to in these affidavits (R. 42)
(contained as an Addendum 4 to this Brief and also to that of
Appellee) contained the critical language in paragraph 2 which
stated:
The State will re-commend Defendant to be treated
in a program of a residential treatment center in lieu
of incarceration. That "residential treatment center"
means Bonneville Community Center, Fremont Community
Center, or a program mutually agreeable to Defendant and
the Probation Department. (R. 42).
On July 31 this Agreement was signed by Mr. Vuyk, the Salt Lake
Deputy County Attorney, by Mr. Athay and by the Defendant.

The

defendant also signed, at this time, the "Statement of Defendant."
It should be noted at this point that several statements by
the appellee are incorrect relating to these events.

For example,

the State has incorrectly cited the quotation of the July 30
hearing as "September 30, 1990".

(Appellee's Brief, p.

3 ) . The

State has also said "On the following day, July 31, 1990,
Defendant, his attorney and the prosecuting attorney entered into a
Plea Agreement." (Appellee's Brief, pp.

3-4). More correctly, the

defendant had previously on the day before studied an Agreement and
the document prepared by the defendant was a clarification of the
Plea Agreement, which was not signed by Defendant until July 31,
1991 when he stood before the Court after it had accepted the Plea
Agreement which guaranteed Defendant should receive probation and
treatment in lieu of incarceration.
Finally, the appellee asserts that "the

-7-

f

State' also agreed to

're-commend' that Defendant be treated in a program of a
residential treatment center in lieu of incarceration..•"
(Appellee's Brief, p.

4) (Emphasis added).

The appellee has

misquoted the syntax of the Plea Agreement to conform to the
language interpretation now argued by the State.

The Agreement

does not state "that Defendant be treated" but instead states
"Defendant to be treated in a program of a residential treatment
center." The syntax of the disputed sentence must be examined
correctly and should not be distorted by the appellee to meet its
own interpretation.
Thus, as of July 31, 1990 the defendant, according to his
undisputed affidavits, believed that in exchange for pleading
guilty to a second degree felony rather than his sought-after third
degree felony he would be turned over to a residential treatment
program and not have to face prison.

This would occur, according

to the defendant, if the lower court approved the Plea Agreement
entered into by the parties.
A reading of the July 31 transcript again shows that
Defendant's belief and interpretation is consistent with what
actually occurred.
On Page 4 of the transcript the Court reviewed the newly
prepared "Plea Agreement" with the defendant.

The following

dialogue occurred between the Court and the defendant:

THE COURT: Also, the State apparently agrees to
recommend some type of an in-patient treatment facility
such as Bonneville or Fremont or something like that.
MR. JONES:

I understand that.
-8-

THE COURT: Part of the Plea Agreement says, and I'll
make sure that you understand this now, if it's not one
of those two, Bonneville or Fremont, then it will be a
mutually agreeable facility between yourself and Adult
Probation and Parole, Is that part of your
understanding?
* * *

MR. JONES:

Yes.

THE COURT: I can tell you right now, I don't approve of
that. I will not allow you to have any input into where
you're going to go if you're on probation. So you need
to know that right up front.
MR. JONES: So you would just take their recommendation?
THE COURT: Whatever they want. If I put you on
probation, you go where they say you go. I can tell you
right now, I won't follow that, even if I decide to put
you on probation. All right. So if—with those things
in mind, you understand that the potential maximum
punishment in this case, if I determine it's
appropriate, Mr. Jones, is a period of incarceration in
the Utah State Prison of not less than one, no more than
fifteen years, and/or a $10,000 fine. Do you understand
that's a possibility in this case?
MR. JONES: I understand.
4-6). (Emphasis added).

(Tr. July 31, 1990, pp.

To the defendant, this dialogue meant that if the lower court
did not approve the Plea Agreement then the defendant would be
subject to imprisonment and would have to decide if he wished to
continue to maintain his guilty plea or to then go to trial.

The

Court then once again went through all of the rights given up in a
guilty plea as the Court had done on the prior day with the
exception that he made no mention that the Court was not bound by
any recommendation made by the prosecutor.

(Id.

pp.

7-10).

When the Court ultimately accepted the guilty plea (Id. at
12-13) the defendant believed that the Court under Rule 11(8)(b)

-9-

had "approved the proposed disposition." When the Court referred
the defendant to the Adult Probation and Parole Department he
believed that the Probation Department would determine an
appropriate treatment center for him but that in no event would he
be sent to prison.
On August 29, 1990 the defendant filed a "Request for
Clarification of Plea Bargain or Thereafter in the Alternative for
Leave to Withdraw Plea."
48).

It was filed by attorney Lorin Pace.

(R.

On September 6, 1990 Gilbert Athay withdrew as Defendant's

attorney.

(R. 58). On September 14, 1990 Jerome Mooney, a newly

retained attorney, filed a "Memorandum in Support of Request for
Clarification of Plea Agreement or Withdrawal of Plea."
59-76).

(R.

This Memorandum stated, in part:

In reliance on his understanding and intent of the
Plea Agreement and upon demand from his probation
officer that it was required and necessary, Mr. Jones
disclosed confidential information about his pedophilic
behavior. He assumed that this information was required
in order for a "purging" of his conduct to occur, to
demonstrate his good faith in entering into the plea
bargain, and for the purpose of protecting the children
involved in this matter, his family, and society by his
obtaining treatment for his disorder. After reading the
Presentence Report issued by the Adult Probation and
Parol Department, Mr. Jones is now aware that this
Department will recommend a prison sentence rather than
the therapy which was the goal of the Plea Agreement.
The Defendant, Mr. Jones, therefore respectfully
requests that his Motion for Clarification of Plea
Agreement be heard prior to his sentencing in this
matter. (R. 62).
At a hearing on September 17, 1990 Defendant's new attorney,
Mr. Mooney, argued that the defendant was seeking specific
performance of the plea bargain that he had entered into.

It was

at this point that the lower court made the following statement:

-10-

I have serious questions whether this motion has
any merit, because I specifically recall that we spent a
substantial amount of time, Mr, Jones and I, determining
whether or not he wanted to enter into this plea. And I
suspect this record will clearly show, that I told Mr,
Jones that I was not bound by anything the State agreed
to, I tell every criminal defendant that, and I think
that will show in the record. If not, you may have
something. (Tr. September 17, 1990, p. 9 ) .
As has been noted, however, the record shows that the Court did not
personally inform the defendant at the time the plea was taken on
July 31, 1991, that the Court was not bound.
At the same time Mr. Mooney "renewed his 'Motion to Continue
the Sentencing1 particularly in light of the fact that I have Dr.
Victor Cline in the courtroom today." (Id.

p.

4 ) . Dr. Cline

then testified as to a five-week-$20,000 program in Minnesota which
he believed would be extremely beneficial to the defendant before
any sentence should be imposed.

(Id. at pp.

10-16) .

The court

took both the Motion for Specific Performance of Vacation of the
Plea and the Motion for Continuance under advisement.

(Id. at

17-18).
It is again noteworthy that on September 24, 1990 the day
before sentencing Defendant filed a Motion to Withdraw his
Request for Leave to Vacate his Plea (R. 127) and also filed a
motin to "Strike Irrelevant Portion of the Presentence Report
Inconsistent With Plea Agreement." He also filed a memorandum in
support of the latter motion.

(R. 115-25).

On September 25, 1990 Mr. Mooney argued before the Court that
the Court had approved the Plea Agreement with the modification
that the defendant could not approve a treatment facility.

In

light of this approval under Rule 11(8) (b) the Probation Department
-11-

should have been directed to determine a treatment facility rather
than recommending prison which was contrary to the Plea Agreement.
Mr. Mooney acknowledged that Mr. Jones understood in the July 30
form affidavit that the Court was not bound by the recommendations
of the prosecution.

However, he clearly pointed out that in the

subsequent July 31 hearing this statement was not made.
September 25, 1990 pp.

(Tr.

17-18).

The lower court after reviewing the transcripts concluded
that:
There is absolutely nothing in this record that
could lead a person to reasonably believe that I bound
myself in any fashion to any type of a sentence. There
is not a Rule 11 conditional plea. There is not one
word in the transcript, or the Plea Agreement that
suggests that this is a conditional plea under Rule 11."
(Id. at 21) .
The Court denied the Motion for Specific Performance and to
Strike the Probation Department report.

(Id. at 20-24).

The

Court also denied Defendant's Motion to Continue the sentencing to
allow the defendant to go to the Minnesota program.
29).

(Id. at

As noted by the State in its Brief (Appellee's Brief, p. 6)

the Court determined that since no previous agreement had been
entered into with the defendant the Court was free to sentence the
defendant to prison and chose to do so.
ARGUMENT
THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE OF HIS RULE 11(8) (b) PLEA
AGREEMENT AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO PRISON.
The State in the Argument portion of its Brief has
misconstrued Defendant's contentions and has somewhat distorted the

-12-

record as it now exists.

(Appellee's Brief, pp. 7-10),

These

contentions will now be examined.
This case is one of first impression before this Court.
Unlike most cases, the defendant is not requesting that his guilty
plea be vacated but is instead specifically requesting performance
of the Agreement.

Both the United States Supreme Court in

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.

257 (1971) and the Utah Supreme

Court in State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986) recognize that
plea bargains are matters of contract and that where a defendant
has taken steps in reliance on a plea bargain agreement that may
prejudice him in a subsequent trial he is entitled to specific
performance of that agreement.

717 P.2d at 1306.

State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296 (Utah App.

This Court in

1989) addressed a

claim that a plea bargain had been violated when a law enforcement
agency recommended prison even though the prosecutor recommended
treatment.

This Court, however, has not specifically addressed the

Rule 11(8)(b) option made available to criminal defendants and
therefore this case is important to establish guidance to other
courts, prosecutors and defendants.
Rule 11(8)(b) states the following:
When a tentative plea agreement has been reached
that contemplates entry of a plea in the expectation
that other charges will be dropped or dismissed the
judge, upon request of the parties, may permit the
disclosure to him of the tentative agreement and the
reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the
plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting
attorney and defense counsel whether he will approve the
proposed disposition.
Moreover, subdivision (c) provides:
If the judge then decides that final disposition
-13-

should not be in conformity with the plea agreement, he
shall advise the defendant and then call upon the
defendant to either affirm or withdraw his plea.
Immediately preceding this section of Rule 11 is subparagraph
(7)(b) which states, "if sentencing recommendations are allowed by
the court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that any
recommendation as to the sentence is not binding on the court."
Unfortunately, Rule 11 is not written with great clarity.
There is no specific procedure outlined as to how paragraph (8) can
be specifically employed by a defendant to avoid the problems which
occurred in the instant case.

Here, there can be no doubt but that

the defendant believed that he had entered into an agreement with
the State whereas he would plead guilty to a second degree felony
in exchange for a guarantee that he would not be incarcerated.
Under his belief the written documents submitted to the lower court
clearly evidenced this proposal and the lower court accepted it
with the exception of modifying the portion allowing the defendant
to choose his own rehabilitation center.

In the defendant's mind

the state was no longer "recommending" a course of action to the
court but instead an agreement had been cut and the lower court had
approved it.
The State, on the other hand, argues that the lower court did
not bind itself as to the action of the prosecutor but instead was
free to send the defendant to prison or to treatment.

Under the

State's argument at no time did the lower court approve the
agreement between the State and the defendant under Rule 8(b)
and (c) but instead proceeded under Rule 7(b) and informed the
defendant that no recommendations of the prosecutor were binding
-14-

upon the court.
The application of these two subdivisions of Rule 8 require
differing results.

If, in fact, a lower court approves a plea

agreement then the State is clearly bound by its bargain.
States v. Holman, 728 F.2d 809, 813 (6th Cir.
v. Cruz, 709 F.2d 111 (1st Cir.
1294 (Utah 1986).

United

1984); United States

1983); State v. Kay, 717 P.2d

At that point, the defendant has the option of

vacating his plea or requesting specific enforcement of the plea
agreement.

United States v. Cruz, 709 F.2d 111 (1st Cir.

1983); United States v. Mercer, 691 F.2d 343 (7th Cir. 1982).
On the other hand, if a binding Rule 11(8) (b) agreement has
not been made by the lower court but the lower court fails to
advise the defendant that he is not bound by the recommendations of
the state then such failure results in the vacation of the guilty
plea.

State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296 (Utah App.

1989).

In

the instant case, Defendant would be entitled as a matter of law to
withdrawing his guilty plea had he not been prejudiced by entering
into the Plea Agreement and by his subsequent conduct in reliance
upon the Agreement.

For purposes of clarifying the arguments of

the State, therefore, the defendant will address both the vacation
of the guilty plea and the specific performance of the Plea
Agreement.
A.

The Lower Court Clearly Failed to
Meet the Requirements of Rule 11 and
Therefore Defendant, if He Desired, Could
Vacate His Guilty Plea.

Rule 11(7) (b) specifically states that the Court "shall advise
the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence

-15-

is not binding on the court." (Emphasis added).

The Utah Supreme

Court as well as this Court has repeatedly held that the time for
such advice must be at the time the plea is taken.

As recently

as July 3, 1991 the Utah Supreme Court stated:
The rule announced in Gibbons was intended to
ensure that the record demonstrates that the judge who
takes the plea personally establishes that a defendant's
guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary. To that
end, Gibbons requires that at the time a guilty plea is
entered the judge should establish on the record that
the defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional
rights and understood the elements of the crime. State
v. Hoff, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22 (July 3, 1991)
(emphasis added);see also State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772
(Utah App. 1990).
There can be no doubt in the record that the lower court on
July 31, 1990, the date the sentence was entered, did not inform
the defendant that the Court was not bound by any recommendation of
the prosecutor.

The citation to the previous day of July 30, 1990

by the State is of no avail.

(Appellee's Brief, p. 3 ) . Also, the

State's reliance upon the fact that the lower court advised the
defendant that he could receive a prison sentence of up to one to
fifteen years is also of no assistance to it.

(Appellee's Brief,

p. 4, 9 ) . The Court was specifically required by Rule 11(5)(e) to
inform the defendant as to the minimum and maximum sentence that
could be imposed as to the offense.

This advice was in no way

related to the other obligation under Rule 7(b) to inform Defendant
concerning recommendations not being binding on the court.
Thus, since under Gibbons the Court must strictly comply with
the requirements of Rule 11 as to those cases in which pleas are
taken after Gibbons was decided, it is apparent that the lower
court failed in its obligation to personally inform the defendant
-16-

on the day of the plea that the "recommendation" of the prosecutor
was not binding upon the court.

See State v. Hoff, supra.

Defendant could clearly, were there not other factors involved,
request that his guilty plea be vacated and that he proceed with
trial.
B.

Because the Defendant Entered Into a
Valid Plea Agreement Which Was Approved
By the Court in Accordance with Rule 11(8) (b)
and (c) the Defendant is Now Entitled to
Specific Performance of Such Agreement.

The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the contractual nature
of a plea bargain.

In State v. West, 765 P.2d 891 (Utah 1988)

the court stated:
To deny defendant relief on the merits, we would
have to assume that he willingly bargained to plead
guilty, expecting and receiving nothing in return. This
assumption is highly speculative and implausible where a
plea bargain is involved. The nature of plea bargains
requires the exchange of consideration, allowing the
parties involved to reach a mutually desirable
agreement. A plea bargain is a contractual relationship
in which consideration is passed. See, Santobello v.
New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); 2 Wharton's Criminal
Procedure, §341 (1975).
In fact, the remedy for a defendant where the state
fails to fulfill its side of the bargain is frequently
specific performance. See, 81 C.J.S. Specific
Performance, §103 (1977); Annot., Supreme Court Views as
to Plea Bargaining and Its Effects, 50 L.Ed.2d 876
(1978). A plea bargain does not involve a situation
where a defendant willingly pleads guilty to a crime,
neither asking or expecting anything in return. Id. at
893.
The facts in this case clearly illustrate the above principle.
In exchange for waiving the preliminary hearing at the circuit
court level the defendant entered into a preliminary agreement with
the prosecutor that all charges would be dropped if the defendant
pled guilty to one charge of sexual abuse.
-17-

Thus, contrary to the

State's assertion (Appellee's Brief, p.

8) the decision to dismiss

the other five charges had already been agreed upon before the
defendant even reached the District Court.

The sole question

remaining for determination was whether Defendant would plead
guilty to a second or to a third degree felony.

As noted in the

recitation of facts, Defendant finally agreed to plead guilty to
the second degree felony on the theory that the prosecutor wanted a
"larger club" to hold over Defendant's head should he fail to
complete his treatment program.

Conversely, the defendant believed

that he was receiving a pre-approved Rule 11(8)(b) plea agreement
which would commend him to a residential treatment center.
There is no question but that the prosecutor willingly signed
the "Plea Agreement" which supplemented the original form
agreement.

Paragraph 2 of that Agreement clearly proclaimed "the

State will re-commend Defendant to be treated in a program of a
residential treatment center in lieu of incarceration." There is
also no question but that the lower court read this agreement and
modified it by stating that the defendant would not be allowed to
mutually select his own treatment center.

Defendant was therefore

clearly entitled to believe that the Court had pre-approved as
required by Rule 11(8)(b) and as Defendant had requested from his
attorney the Plea Agreement and that it would stand with the
exception of his selection of a treatment center.
Before the sentence was imposed of incarceration and after
Defendant saw that the Agreement as he understood it was not being
fulfilled by the State he submitted an affidavit of Dr. Thomas
Huckin who is an acknowledged expert in English language usage at
-18-

the University of Utah.

(R. 109) . Dr. Huckin in his affidavit (a

copy of which is contained as Addendum 5) stated the following:
In my judgment, the word "re-commend" is a
legitimate English word meaning "commend again" as used
in the sentence, "The State will re-commend Defendant to
be treated in a program of a residential treatment
center in lieu of incarceration," the word appears to
have that meaning (assuming standard formal English
orthography and syntax).
It is quite possible that someone reading that
sentence would think that the writer intended to mean
"recommend" but the writer claims that he meant "commend
again" and the spelling of the word ("re-commend") and
the syntactic structure of the sentence supports his
claim.
The plea agreement signed by the prosecutor and approved by
the lower court was clear and unambiguous.

Even if both the

prosecutor and the court were under the mistaken notion that
Defendant believed the State was only "recommending" a treatment
program the plain language of the agreement controls.

In United

States v. Partida-Parra, 859 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1988) the
prosecutor mistakenly signed a plea agreement in which the wrong
section of the federal code was cited thereby allowing defendant to
plead guilty to a misdemeanor rather than to a felony. The
district court allowed the government to rescind the agreement but
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the agreement was
binding upon the government and that the defendant was entitled to
specific performance.
The United States Supreme Court has held that if a plea
bargain is shown to have been contrary to the rights of a
defendant, there are two options available for the court. First,
the court, upon the request of the defendant, may withdraw the
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guilty plea and place the defendant in as near a postion as
possible prior to the plea agreement having been made.

Second, the

court may order specific performance of the plea agreement
regardless of the protests of the government.

Santobello v.

New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
The Supreme Court in Kay, supra, held that while nothing in
Rule 11 specifically allows a conditional plea to be made, there is
also nothing which prohibits a conditional plea from being entered.
In fact, the Court found that the better reasoned cases and policy
considerations allow a court to disclose a proposed sentence as
part of the plea bargaining process so long as a judge acts as a
moderator and not as an advocate.

Id. at 1300-01.

The court

stated:
In fact, subpart (e)(6) of the 1983 Rule 11
[subsequently renumbered in the 1989 amendment with no
change in meaning] requires the judge to inform the
defendant that the judge is not bound by any
recommendations of the prosecutor as to the sentence,
yet it implicitly recognizes that the judge must be able
to exercise broad discretion in sentencing.
Essentially, subpart (e)(6) assures a prosecutor cannot
limit the trial judge's authority in sentencing, but it
does not prohibit the judge from committing himself to
imposing a particular sentence as a condition of a plea
agreement. Id. at 1300, fn. 5. (Emphasis added).
In the instant case, it is apparent that the trial court bound
itself with the prosecutor as to the specific disposition of the
case.

By informing the defendant that the court would not allow

the defendant to pick an alternate residence site, the court
expressly or impliedly approved the other terms of the Plea
Agreement.

Thus, Defendant entered a conditional plea that he

would waive his constitutional right to a jury trial in exchange
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for the State dismissing the other counts and cases against him and
that he definitely be placed in a probationary treatment program
and not in prison.
In Kay, the Utah Supreme Court noted the similarities and
differences between the State Rule 11 and the Federal Rule 11.
Contrary to the statements of the appellee (Appellee's Brief, p.
9) the Utah Court adopted many of the cases interpreting the
Federal Rule 11 and applied them to the State rule.

The court

noted, for example, that while the State Rule suggests that a trial
court can withdraw a plea agreement even after a guilty plea has
been formally accepted and entered on the record (which is directly
contrary to the Federal Rule), nevertheless "this power, should not
be taken literally.

In appropriate circumstances, due process and

double jeopardy considerations will prohibit the judges from
reniging on the agreement." Id. at 1299, fn.

3.

The Supreme Court in Kay approved the procedure utilized by
the First Circuit#Court of Appeals in United States v. Cruz, 709
F.2d 111 (1st Cir.

1983) in determining whether a guilty plea can

be set aside or specifically performed.
analogous to the instant case.

The Cruz case is closely

In that case the defendant was

indicted for aiding and abetting and possession with intent to
distribute cocaine.

Pursuant to a plea bargain between the

defendant and the government the U.S.

Attorney filed an

information charging defendant with simple possession of cocaine
which was a misdemeanor.

Also, the government agreed to recommend

that the defendant be placed on probation.

The defendant was

informed that the prosecutor's recommendation of probation was not
-21-

binding on the court and that he could receive the maximum sentence
under the state of a fine of $1,000 or imprisonment for not more
than one year or both.

At the conclusion of defendant's

interrogation the trial court stated:
After having addressed the defendant personally,
after having ascertained that he knows what is contained
in the information filed this morning with the court and
that he knows his right to a trial by jury and the
effects of pleading guilty, whereby he is waiving all
his rights, he knows what the maximum punishment is and
he is voluntarily pleading guilty, therefore I will
accept the same and a judgment of guilty would be
entered as to the one count in the information, I will
order a presentence report and at the time the same has
been prepared we would set the case for sentence.
Id. at 112.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals found it was clear that the
trial court had "unqualifiedly accepted the plea bargain." Under
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure a court is given the option
to accept a plea, reject a plea, or defer acceptance or rejection
until it has an opportunity to consider the presentence report.

On

December 11, the day of sentencing, the court rejected the plea
bargain.

The court said that in light of the sentences of four and

eight-year imprisonment given to other defendants justice would not
be done in defendant's case if probation for one year was the
sentence.
The defendant appealed on the basis that the lower court did
not have the right to vacate the plea bargain and asked for
specific performance.

The First Circuit Court of Appeals agreed

and stated:
There is no authority for the District Court's
action in the instant case. Of course, the Court
initially had discretion to accept or reject the plea
agreement or defer determination until, with the
-22-

defendant's permission, it had examined the presentence
report. But, once the court accepted the agreement,
thereby binding the defendant and the prosecution, it
could not simply change its mind on the basis of
information in the presentence report, at least where
that information revealed less than fraud on the court.
Id. at 114-15. (Emphasis added).
The State contends that the lower court simply "accepted
Defendant's guilty plea" and did not "specifically or by inference
accept the Plea Agreement." (Appellee's Brief, p.
This statement is simply incorrect.

10, fn. 4).

On June 30, in urging the

defendant to take time to examine the documents before entering his
plea the court specifically stated, "We can either pursue this plea
bargain, and based on what I've heard at this point in time, I'm
willing to approve it, or we can go to trial." (Tr.

July 30,

1990, p. 13). This statement made directly to the defendant
certainly gave the defendant the understanding that the Court was
examining the agreement and not merely accepting his plea.
Furthermore, the Court's modification of the choice of
rehabilitation centers together with the failure of the Court in
the July 31 hearing to inform the defendant that he was not bound
by any recommendation of the prosecutor also strongly indicated
that the Court was accepting the Agreement as written and not
merely accepting a plea to a charge.
Finally, it is important to note in this case that the
defendant raised the objections to the interpretation now urged by
the State even before he received any sentence.

This is not the

typical "sour grapes" appeal in which the defendant is disappointed
at the time of sentencing and thereafter concocts a defense as to
why the sentence should not be imposed.
-23-

Here, the defendant

strenuously objected to the presentence report prepared by the
Adult Parole and Probation Department recommending prison even
though, as far as the defendant knew, the Court would honor the
agreement and send the defendant to a rehabilitation center*

While

Defendant originally sought to withdraw his plea he determined that
because of the statements he made to the probation department,
police agencies, witnesses and others in reliance upon the Plea
Agreement that he could not receive a fair trial and therefore
specific performance of the Agreement was the only option
available.

See, Phillips v. United States, 679 F.2d 192 (9th Cir.

1982); Stowers v. State, 363 N.E.2d 978 (Ind.

1977).

It is therefore submitted that when the entire series of
factual events are examined, when the language of the various
documents are examined, when the context of the various court
hearings and dialogue is examined, that the contention by the State
in its Brief that Defendant got what he had bargained for is simply
incorrect.

Defendant bargained for a treatment program in exchange

for a second degree felony plea.

Instead, he received a prison

sentence to which he would never had agreed to on the basis of a
second degree felony.

The defendant is therefore entitled to now

assert the basis of his bargain and to be allowed into a
residential treatment center to be selected by the Probation
Department and approved by the lower court.

There is simply no

other option available to the defendant under the facts of this
case even though he would clearly be entitled to vacate his guilty
plea were he not irreparably harmed by his conduct in reliance upon
the bargain.
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CONCLUSION
This case is important to the defendant because he has now
been wrongfully incarcerated.

It is also important, however, to

establish legal standards for Rule 11(8)(b) and for specific
performance of guilty pleas.
Defendant is entitled to receive out of prison treatment since
that is what he negotiated—in exchange the State avoided a costly
trial and received a second degree felony conviction.

The lower

court was incorrect in concluding that the "Plea Agreement" was not
a binding agreement which required treatment not prison.
For the preceding reasons, therefore, Defendant is entitled to
specific performance of his Agreement—immediate release from
prison and enrollment in a residential treatment program.
DATED this 5th day of August, 1991.

Jeirome H. Mooney
Attorney for Defendant-A^j/ellant
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies of
the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant to R. Paul Van Dam,
Attorney General and Judith S.H. Atherton, Assistant Attorney
General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this 5th day
of August, 1991.
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ADDENDUM

Transcript from Tape Recording Obtained from Susanne Humphries
Third Circuit Court:

Judge Palmer, Friday, April 20, 1990, 9:30 A.M.

Judge Palmer (JP): Richard Jones?
D. Gilbert Athay, Defense Attorney (DA):
A — Gilbert Athay appearing on behalf of Mr. Jones.
He is present.
JP:

Okay.

I understand you've waived reading of the information?

DA:

That's correct your Honor. This matter is on for preliminary
hearing for next week. This is the matter tht I talked to you
about --

JP:

Yes.

DA:

-- a couple of days ago.

JP:

And you wish to wave that hearing?

DA:

We have reached an - a - a tentative agreement - a - with the
County attorney's office. We are in the process of finalizing
negotiations: The County Attorney has offered to permit
Mr. Jones to plea to one second degree felony - that being a
Non minimum mandatory prison sentence case. They have agreed
to recommend counseling in lieu of incarceraton.
We have offered to plea to one third degree, with the same
terms applying, and we are going to resolve this case somewhere
between these two - a - perameters.

JP:

Okay.

DA:

-- And with that understanding, your Honor, Mr Jones -(inaudiable comments between DA and Defendant)
With that Understanding, your Honor, Mr. Jones has agreed to
give up and allay his preliminary hearing - a - on the
— what do we have — three files — three cases.

JP:

Yes* They are here.

Is that correct Mr. Jones?

Defendant Jones (DJ):
Well, your Honor, (cleared throiight)
Included in the Understanding was that all other charges were
Dismissed and no other charges be filed.
DA:

That will happen.

JP:

Yes.

f^^ •

ni/^**

There are four files her*Mr. Athay.

JP:

You understand the rights you give up then by waiving'your
preliminary hearing Mr. Jones?

DJ:

I Do.

JP:

And that's what you wish to do?

DJ:

Under these Conditions, Yes.

JP:

Alright, let the record show the Defendant has summarily and
voluntarily waived his preliminary hearing and is Ordered bound
over for Arraignment in District Court. That is before
Judge Timothy Hansen on April 30th, Mr. Athay, at .9 A.M.

DA:

Thank you your Honor.

JP:

You May.

DA & DJ:

Thank You.

May we be excused?

Addendum 2

EXH3BJT

Richard Ul. Jones
Box 526234
Salt Lake Citv, Utah
Telephone:
467-7262

#1

84152
June

12, 1990

D. Gilbert Athay
72 East 400 South, Suite 325
Salt Lake City, Utah
94111
RE:

Demand for filing of Motion For Acceptance Of A Rule 11 (S > C b >
Plea under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
and supporting information.

Dear Gi1,
I am writina this letter to formally demand that you file a
Motion For Acceptance Qi A Rule 11(8) (b) Plea with Judge Timothv
Hansen pertaining to the Criminal actions against me in Third District
Court.
In addition, I shall have a brief in support of this motion
prepared and filed.
There are several very compelling reasons for this, but none
are more relevant than the fact that I am the Defendant and want the
motion filed. No argument about how Utah Judges over the past 10
years have not granted such motions, or that you s^r& too busy, have
any bearing on this matter.
If the legislature did not see conditions under which a Rule
11(8) (b) plea is warranted, it would not be provided for bv Statute.
A good Judge like Timothy Hansen will hear the motion in good faith a^
part of his judicial duty, and will not be biased bv convention, but
will rule on the merits of the motion.
The compelling reasons for the Court to consider are that the
prosecutor trulv feels that prison would serve no useful purpose in or
case, and I should take counseling instead.
He also would like to see
a 1 to 15 year deterent to the possibility of probation violation.
His RECOMMENDATION to this effect is being made in good faith, but thu
Judge will not necessarily believe that because a plea bargain is
being made. Though the size of the deterent makes no difference to
me, because I know that I will never violate probation., the
possibility that the Judge may not understand the case fully and order
a prison sentence, makes a Second Degree plea unacceptable unless it
be with the judges prior approval of the proposed disposition.
I once told vou that if push came to shove, I would eventually ^cc&pt
a Second Degree Plea with the prosecutor's recommendation of no
incarceration.
However, after reading of several cases where people
ended in prison for 1 to 15 year terms after making a plea bargain
carrying such a prosecutor recommendation, I will not accept such an
arrangement unless it be under rule 11(8) (b) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.

be-fore the Judge so that he will be able to see that the charges were
made in excess of what really happened.
No general talk about the
judge already understanding that police put things in police reports
which ar& not true, and prosecutors -file extra charges as a tactic
when they know that the charges will not hold up, is going to weigh as
heavily as the actual -facts.
The Attorney Fee Agreement which we signed requires that you
either get the charges dismissed or obtain a plea bargain acceotable
to me.
If you fail to do that, I am entitled to get the $15,000
consideration back.
A Second Degree Felony plea is Not acceptable to
me unless it were made in abeyance or under Rule 11 with the good
faith recommendations that the prosecutor has offered.
Unless ce-tain rumors that I have heard are true, the
prosecutor will accspt
the Motion whole heartedly as the soluticn in
acheiving the good faith offer that he made to us 4 months ago.
In
any event, he must accept it as a reasonable effort to complete our
negotlati ons.
I may confirm other requests which I have made of you with
future letters, but I believe that this Rule 11 action may make those
issues mute.
Thank you for your courage and wisdom.
you for helping me file this Rule 11 Motion.
difference.
^^»
^^
^—)

But most of all. thank
It will make all the

I have received a copy of the (charge) (information)
against me, I have read it, and I understand the nature and
elements of the offense(^) for which I am pleading (guilty) (A«qon^eatT*.
The elements of the criae(^) of which I am charged are as
follows: U*4ev* C<«~ t_^«^i«, J>»*i<• e ^ VoJ- \*n*««A—^ h CAf* <?4 A

«#• « — — —

0< jfbcA/t 1^/f/fjLizzie
and I w e n t i n t o t h r bedroom ,?nd I t o o l : my s w e a t p a n t s
cnmplf?tn1y of r . «?hn k n e t ' l n d hesidc* ma en tn*: he d as* I l a v e d dewn,
l i f t e d my «-.hirt J<P a n c < h e a a n t o p i a v ' w i t h my p e n i s .
She Vtest s a v i n g .
"Now can I open i t ? " <r«s mv p e n i s s t a r t e d t o become e r e c t , b u t I
r a y i n g t h a t i t was n o t hard v e t .
F i n a l l y , I was f u l l y .*?rr?ct.
rofuc?eH,
L i ' i r i p l o o k e d a t me and -said a g a i n , "Now ci\n I ? "
I s a i d , "Oh, L i r * i e ,
i-f ynu l e t me f i n i s h ,-inri <~hoot sperm on vnu. t h e n you can o p " it*" . —
Shf =:.aid. "Mow do I Ho i t ? "
T a*?4:^ri h e r t o l a v down and l i f t up her
tshirt.
She l i f t e d i t up ' " • p o ^ i n n h e r s e l f froir. \\rr wa*te« a l m o s t t c
j k n r a l ^ d by'ni d» h e r and mastwrbatrsd u n t i l ^r*rx
sauirtsd
h r 7 r r>CyCi •.
nntn h r r stomach.
" L ; : z i * - ; ! Hold « - t i l l ' \ T ^ a x d .
"Vou w i l l not i t • n
-./our n e t h e r , .
J u s t h o - d « , t i i l . I w i l l be r i g h t b«%ck".
I went i n t o
i h e b n t h r o n m and m o i s t e n e d a t o w e l on one i ? i d e , t h e n r e t u r n e d t o h e r
•and c l e a n e d and d r i e d h^r s t o m a c h .
My f a n t a c y h a d b e e n f u l f i l l e d .

, * 4 .—.4^4*4/ cum wixn
knowledge and understanding of the following facts:
1.
I know that I have the right to be represented by an
attorney, and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be
appointed by the court at no cost to me.
I recognize that a
condition of my sentence may be to require ne to pay an amount,
as determined by the court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so
appointed for ma.
jg£2.
I (have not) (have> waived my right to counsel.
If I
have waived my right to counsel, I have done so knowingly,

intelligently and voluntarily for the following reasons:

i | ^ 3 . If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this
statement
and understand the nature and elements of the
charges, my rights in this and other proceedings and ths
consequences of my plea of guilty.
4.
If. I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney
/ and I have had an opportunity
to discuss this statement, my rights and the consequences of my
guilty plea with my attorney.
5.
I know that I have a right to a trial by jury.
6.
I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have
them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have
the right to compel my witness(es) by subpoena at state expense
to testify in court upon my behalf.
7.
I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf
but if I choose not to do so I can not be compelled to testify
or give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will
be drawn against me if I do not testify,
8.
I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me
I need only plead "not guilty11 and the matter will be set for
trial. At the trial the state of Utah will have the burden of
proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.
If the trial is before a jury the verdict must be unanimous.
9.
I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I
were tried and convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would
have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah
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Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and
that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal,
those costs would be paid by the state.
10. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for
flagg" offense to which I plead (guilty) (nn-nant^r^). /i know
that by pleading (guilty) (nn - rnntgurt) to an offense that
•carries a minimum mandatory sentence that I will be subjecting
myself to serving a minimum mandatory sentence for
that
offense,
I know that the sentences may be consecutive and may
be for a prison term, fine, or both.^ I know that in addition
to a fine a twenty-five percent (25%) surcharge, required by
Utah Code Annotated 63-63a-4, will be imposed,
I also know
that I may be ordered by the court to make restitution to any
victim(s) of my crimes.
11. I
know that imprisonment may be for consecutive
periods, or the fine for additional amounts, if my plea is to
more than one charge. I also know that if I am on probation,
parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I
have been convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in
the present action may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed upon me.
12. I know and understand that by pleading (guilty) («•
caRfeeatf I am waiving my statutory and constitutional rights
set out in the preceding paragraphs.
I also know that by
entering such plea (4,) I am admitting and do so admit that I
have committed the conduct alleged and I am guilty of the
crime(I) for which my plea(^) is/a*e entered.
13. My plea(/) of (guilty) (no contest) (is) (is—nofc)» the
result of a plea bargain between myself and the prosecuting
attorney. The promises, duties and provisions of this plea

bargain, if any, are fully contained in the Plea Agreement
attached to this affidavit- S e ^ * r W c A *' •
14. I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my
plea^) of (guilty) (no-c<H*feest) I must do so by filing a
motion within thir { (30) days after entry of my plea.
15. I know t*.*.t any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by
either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they
express to me as to what they believe the court may do are also
not binding on the court.
16. Mo threats, coercion, <Jr unlawful influence of any
kind have been ma
to induce me to plead guilty, ai?d . no
promises except, those contained herein and in t-ha af^r^ed
plea iHjrnemc»ntf, have been made to me.
17. I have read this statement or I have had it read to me
by my attorney, and I understand its provisions. I know that I
am
free to change or delete anything contained in this
statement. I do not wish to make any changes because ail of
the statements .are correct.
18. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my
attorney.
19. I am
H b
years of age; I have attended school
through the & S V£»<yy* grade and I can read and understand the
English language or an interpreter has been provided to me.
I
was not under the influence of any drugs, medication or
intoxicants which would impair my judgment when the decisionwas
made to enter the plea(4). I am not presently under the
influence of any drug, medication or intoxicants which impair
my judgments

20.

I

believe
c,Liev
e

myself

t-« u

aentaliy capaMe or u n d e r s t a n d ' 0 ' ™ * « " " - c r n i n , B i
tha
consequences „f my plea and T
P « = e e d l n g s and
'
a y Mntal
or impairment
that
„ould
" " "
« » " . . . der^t
W i
t n t e U i c e n t l y and voluntarily e n t e w T
"L ' " "
^ "

DATED ttLj^f

, f jg^Of**'

Ml .W~< „ „ ^ M/fT/VlJ ffF" .

-. -_

CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY

statement or that x na " e * ^
^'^TreaT^e
'
d
to hi
h
discussed it vith him/her ' " . ".
»/ « and i n a v .
bel
understands the D e a n i n , 'o£ "?
" « «»t he/she rully
Physically competent. T o toe ^
" f T ^ " ffle»*^ «M
'««
an appropriate i n J ^ L o n " **»"-»• and bel i. r
» » - V ) and the ractual synopsis^" 1 1 «*« — - n t . or th.
»ndu=t are correctly ^ t *
°' **" ieC««™'s
criminal
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1. That all other ccunts and cases pendinc apainst the Defendant
= nai 1 be dismissed, except for count III of case s901900701 wnich
•hall be reduced to Sexual abuse of a child, which is a second decree
:
elcnv which carries a sentence of 1 to 15 vear imprisonment, and .-'or
5 10,000 ^ine, ^.nd can be suspended.
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AFFIDAVIT

I, Thomas N. Huckin, am an expert in English language usage. I have a
Ph.D. in Linguistics from the University of Washington and an A.B. in
English from Princeton. I have taught English as an Assistant Professor at
the University of Michigan, as an Associate Professor at Carnegie Mellon
University, and, since last year, as an Associate Professor at the
University of Utah, where I also direct the University Writing Program. I
have written four books and more than 25 scholarly papers on the English
language, and have been cited as an authority in Webster's Dictionary of
English Usage (1989).
I have read Exhibit #1, a Plea Agreement between the State of Utah,
Plaintiff, and Richard W. Jones, Defendant, dated July 31,1990, and an
accompanying affidavit from Attorney Lorin N. Pace dated September 14,
1990. Further, I have heard from the Defendant his version of the events
described in the affidavit, which are essentially in agreement with that
description.
In my judgment, the word "re-commend" is a legitimate English word
meaning "commend again." As used in the sentence, "The State will
re-commend Defendant to be treated in a program of a residential
treatment center in lieu of incarceration," the word appears to have that
meaning (assuming standard formal English orthography and syntax).
It is quite possible that someone reading that sentence would think that
the writer intended to mean "recommend." But the writer claims that he
meant "commend again," and the spelling of the word ("re-commend") and
the syntactic structure of the sentence support his claim. At this point,
we cannot know for sure what was in the writer's mind at the time he
wrote the sentence. But his position is clear, consistent, and reasonable
- as far as I can tell -- and those who signed the document did not
challenge his usage. Therefore, I think he deserves the benefit of any
doubt.

Thomas N. Huckin

Addendum 5
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